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ABSTRACT 
A classic problem in both the public economics and game 
theory literature is how to allocate the joint costs of a public 
enterprise equitably among the customers. Traditional normative 
solutions, like Ramsey pricing or the Shapley value, have the 
distinct disadvantage of requiring full information about demand, 
which in practice may not be known. This paper describes a simple 
noncooperative bidding mechanism that discovers the efficient set 
to serve and simultaneously allocates costs. Consumers bid to 
be served and the game regulator offers to serve that' coalition 
that maximizes net surplus. It is shown that a Nash equilibrium -- 
indeed a strong Nash equilibrium--for this noncooperative game 
always exists, no matter what the cost function, and the resulting 
set of consumers served is economically efficient. The resulting 
allocations constitute a normative solution concept for cooper- 
ative games that is apparently new and generalizes the core in 
a natural way. The principal application is to determine prices 
and output levels for a regulated public enterprise with incom- 
plete information about demand. 
COST ALLOCATION AND DEMAND REVELATION 
I N  PUBLIC ENTERPRISES* 
H.P. Young 
MOTIVATION 
The a i m  o f  t h i s  p a p e r  i s  t o  d e s c r i b e  a s i m p l e  method f o r  
a l l o c a t i n g  j o i n t  c o s t s  i n  c o o p e r a t i v e  o r  p u b l i c  e n t e r p r i s e s  by 
a n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  b i d d i n g  mechanism. 
T r a d i t i o n a l  approaches  t o  t h e  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  problem s u f f e r  
from t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  t h a t ,  i m p l i c i t l y  o r  e x p l i c i t l y ,  demands -- 
and hence  t h e  o p t i m a l  scale of  p r o d u c t i o n  --are assumed t o  be 
known. F o r  example, t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  on p u b l i c  u t i l i t y  p r i c i n g  
and o p t i m a l  t a x a t i o n  c o n c e n t r a t e s  on t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s i t u a t i o n :  
t h e r e  are l a r g e  homogeneous m a r k e t s ,  demands are known, and t h e  
o b j e c t  is t o  f i n d  p r i c e s  and o u t p u t s  t h a t  maximize some o b j e c t i v e  
l i k e  consumer s u r p l u s ,  s u b j e c t  t o  a z e r o - p r o f i t  c o n s t r a i n t  
(Ramsey, 1927; Manne, 1952; Baumol and Bradford ,  1 9 7 0 ) .  R e c e n t l y ,  
c o o p e r a t i v e  game t h e o r y  h a s  begun t o  be  a p p l i e d  t o  problems i n  
c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  and r e g u l a t e d  p r i c i n g ;  see f o r  example Sharkey,  
1974; F a u l h a b e r ,  1975; Sharkey and T e l s e r ,  1978; Zajac, 1978; 
Young, Okada and Hashimoto, 1 9 8 0 ) .  
These methods u s u a l l y  t a k e  t h e  set o f  goods t o  be  produced as 
g i v e n ,  and s e e k  t o  a l l o c a t e  t h e  f u l l  c o s t s  of  p roduc ing  t h e s e  
goods among t h e  consumers a c c o r d i n g  t o  normat ive  and s t r a t e g i c  
* 
The a u t h o r  w i s h e s  t o  thank  S tephen  Ross, W i l l i a m  Sharkey,  and 
John Panzar  f o r  h e l p f u l  s u g g e s t i o n s  t h a t  l e d  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t  form 
o f  t h i s  paper .  
considerations. The methods are able to cope with more general 
cost functions and small, differentiated markets but implicitly 
they assume it is known which goods should be produced and what 
consumers are willing to pay for them. 
The approach we take here differs from these in that neither 
demands nor the optimal level of production are assumed known. 
Rather, they are "discovered" by use of a noncooperative bidding 
mechanism. The method is in much the same spirit as some of the 
recent literature on the design of incentives for public goods 
(see Green and Laffont, 1979: Tlaffont, 1979) and indeed is similar 
to what Green and Laffont call a "direct revelation mechanism". 
But there is an important difference: in these other mechanisms 
the cost allocations are typically incorporated into the descrip- 
tion of the alternatives themselves, but the selection mechanisms 
are insensitive to which particular way of allocating the costs 
is chosen. 
In the present approach an explicit cost allocation emerges 
as an equilibrium of a competitive bidding process. Typically 
there is no dominant strategy solution, so the outcome may not 
reveal consumers' true demands; nevertheless it reveals them par- 
tially--enough to ensure that the level of production is efficient 
Since this is the essential point of knowing the demands in the 
first place, little is lost. An equilibrium outcome in pure stra- 
tegies always exists and, we will show, has a very natural inter- 
pretation in terms of generalized marginal cost pricing. 
However, as in the public goods problem, there may be a sur- 
plus generated by the bidding process, i.e. the consumers may bid 
more than the total cost of serving them. In one sense, this 
surplus can be viewed as the price of eliciting information, but 
in some cases it is a deeper phenomenon that is connected with 
the structure of the cost function itself and might be called 
"structural surplus". Indeed it may correspond to nothing more 
than ordinary producer's surplus in a competitive market (see 
Example 2 below). 
Finally it is worth emphasizing that this is meant to be a 
partial equilibrium model and we assume away any income effects 
by unabashedly describing consumers' utility in terms of willing- 
ness-to-pay. The chief application of the model is in situations 
where the costs of goods and services of a public or cooperative 
enterprise must be allocated among a well-defined (usually small) 
number of potential customers and their willingness-to-pay is 
not known. 
2. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
A very convenient way to describe the cost allocation prob- 
lem in considerable generality is by means of the characteristic 
function concept in cooperative game theory. Let N = (1,2, ..., n) 
denote a finite set of players who are potential customers of 
goods or services provided by a cooperative or public enterprise 
(such as a water, electricity, or telephone company). For sim- 
plicity, we assume that each customer is either served or not 
at some targeted level; in other words each customer is identified 
with a specific consumption bundle. Under suitable assumptions 
the model can be generalized readily to allow for different levels 
of consumption and nondiscrete goods. We also allow price discrim- 
ination but the model can be readily modified to accommodate non- 
discriminatory solutions. 
Let c(S) be the cost of serving the customers in the set S, 
for every subset SSN. By convention we take c(b) = 0 .  The 
function c is the enterprise's joint cost function. 
It is frequently the case that such an enterprise enjoys 
increasing returns to scale. One way of expressing this condition 
is to say that the cost function is subadditive, that is, c(S) + 
c (T) 2 c(SUT) whenever S and T are disjoint. In other words the 
single enterprise can produce S and T at least as cheaply as two 
enterprises could produce S and T separately. In fact this "joint 
production" assumption is sometimes taken to be a definition of 
a natural monopoly in the public utility literature (Faulhaber, 
1975; Zajac, 1978). However this assumption is not needed in 
much of what follows, and will only be noted when necessary. 
Let bi be the benefit, or willingness-to-pay, of customeri 
to be included in the enterprise, and define the surplus value 
of any coalition S to be its members' total willingness-to-pay, 
net of costs: I 
The Pareto ideal is to serve some set S having maximum sur- 
plus value; any such set S is said to be efficient. A significant 
problem, in the absence of information on demand, is to determine 
which set, or sets, are efficient. 
In cooperative game theory, knowledge of the efficient set 
is typically taken for granted. Further, the value of any coali- 
tion is usually defined to be the maximum value among all of its 
subcoalitions. This gives the characteristic function 
- 
v(S) = max v(T) 2 0 for all S E N  . 
TSS 
. - 
By definition, v(N) is the maximum surplus obtainable by any 
coalition. The usual approach is then to apply some normative 
solution concept like the core, the nucleolus, or the Shapley 
value to allocate the benefits, xi (equivalently the costs pi, 
the connection being that x; = b; - p;). For example, the core 
* A. A. 
of v is the set of all vectors x = (xl, ..., xn) satisfying 
- 
and 
- 
Ixi = v(N) (zero-profit) 
N 
- * hi 2 v(S) (group-rationality) . 
S 
When voluntary agreement is required the group-rationality 
principle seems quite compelling. It also has another interesting 
interpretation in the context of public utility pricing: if prices 
of a regulated monopoly are set such that Lei - c(S) > 0 for some 
S 
subset of products S (which implies that (4) is violated) there 
is a risk that another firm could underbid these prices 
and still make a profit. Hence one reason for choosing a solution 
in the core is that it prevents competitive entry (Faulhaber, 
1975; Panzar and Willig, 1977). 
' A  special case of this set-up is the problem of providing 
a single public good at fixed cost with exzlusion possible. Then 
the cost function has the form c (4) = 0 and c ( 5 )  = c 2 0 for 
all S # 4. If b. > 0 for all i then the efficient set is N and 
1 = 
the surplus game has a core. 
In the public utilities literature the classical approach 
to cost allocation is Ramsey pricing, which asks for prices and 
quantities that maximize consumer surplus subject to a profit 
constraint, usually zero-profit. In the present framework this 
has a simple enough interpretation: find prices p. 5 bi and a 
1 - 
set S such that ipi = c(S) and lbi - &pi is maximized. In other 
S 
words, find an efficient set and divide its costs in any way con- 
sistent with willingness-to-pay. (Ramsey pricing becomes more 
interesting under nondiscriminatory pricing.) 
In practice, the difficulty with both of these approaches 
is that only i may know bi. The problem for the regulator is how 
to elicit sufficient information about the bits to implement an 
efficient decision, and simultaneously cover costs. We now de- 
scribe a mechanism for achieving this. 
3. THE NONCOOPERATIVE BIDDING MECHANISM 
Let each player submit a sealed bid naming the amount, pi, 
that he would be willing to pay to be served (this may not equal 
his true willingness-to-pay). If included, he pays p; and his 
* .L 
net payoff is bi -pi: if not his payoff is zero . On the basis 
of the bids submitted, the regulator or auctioneer determines a 
set S that maximizes lp - c(S) and announces this set. (Note 
s i 
that lpi 2 c (S) since the empty set has zero surplus; indeed, the 
S 
empty-set may be the one announced.) The players may then revise 
their bids. The regulator terminates the process after some pre- 
determined (but undisclosed) number of rounds or by using some 
* 
convergence criterion. The last-announced set S is the definitive 
outcome: the excluded players have no recourse, and the enterprise 
* * 
serves the players in S at the prices last bid. Since Jzi ic(S 1 ,  
all costs are allocated and in some cases a surplus may remain. 
The existence of an end surplus may be associated with the price 
of eliciting information, but in some situations it also has a 
* 
Thi-s assumes that i cannot provide the good or service for 
himself at cost c(i). If he can, then his payoff would be 
max{bi -c(i),0} even when he is excluded from the enterprise. 
The equilibrium payoffs in this case turn out to be exactly the 
same as in the case treated in the text (provided c is subadditive) 
because in the latter case the equilibrium prices must satisfy 
pi 2 min{bi,c(i)l (see Young, 1980). 
structural meaning. In particular, if v has no core, then the 
existence of a surplus may be interpreted instead as the price 
of achieving a stable outcome. The possibility of a surplus 
is well-known in other treatments of the public goods problem 
(Green and Laffont, 1979) . 
As a practical matter, the surplus might be taken in the 
form of a lump-sum tax. Another possibility is that it be re- 
distributed to the players served in proportion to their final 
bids. In theory this could lead to players distorting their 
willingness-to-pay by overbidding, but as a practical matter it 
seems unlikely that much distortion would result because the 
players do not know the others' bids (indeed may not even know 
the cost function), hence do not know how much is available to 
be redistributed. 
Formally a mechanism is defined as a function g(pl,. . . ,pn) = S 
that tells which set is served as a function of the bids submitted. 
g can also be interpreted as a supply function, since it gives 
quantities produced as a function of prices. g is a surplus- 
mazimiztng mechanism if 
( 5 )  g p  p n  = S implies lpi - c(S) 2 lpi - c ( S 1 )  
S S ' 
for all S' C N  . 
Note that the surplus-maximizing g is uniquely defined, 
except when two or more sets have exactly the same surplus with 
respect to p. Note also that g(p) may be the empty set, and that 
- - 
the surplus of g(p) is always nonnegative. 
- 
The cost allocation game associated with a mechanism g is 
the normal-form, noncooperative game 4 defined as follows: 
A highly desirable equilibrium concept for such a game is a 
strengthening of the Nash equilibrium due to Aurnann (1959), known 
as a strong equilibrium. A s t r o n g  e q u i l i b r i u m  has the property 
that no player, or group of players, can simultaneously change 
their strategies and each do better (barring side-payments). 
This concept has sometimes been interpreted as a cooperative 
equilibrium notion, since it means that no coordinated action 
by a coalition of players can improve the payoffs of all members 
of the coalition. But it is also an important noncooperative 
equilibrium concept, since it means that no uncoordinated, but 
simultaneous, groping by the players will be reinforced. Any 
observer of simultaneous auctions will recognize this as an 
important condition for stability. Unfortunately, not many games 
possess such equilibria. 
Theorem I .  For any  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  c t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  s u r p l u s -  
m a x i m i z i n g  mechanism g s u c h  t h a t  t h e  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  
game h a s  a  s t r o n g  e q u i l i b r i u m .  Moreover ,  f o r  any 
such  e q u i l i b r i u m  p t h e  s e t  produced ,  g ( p ) ,  i s  
- 
e f f i c i e n t .  
Some choices of g, i.e. some ways of breaking ties in the 
surplus-maximizing mechanism, do not produce an equilibrium. 
In theory, this means that the auctioneer may have to "probe" 
different ways of breaking ties if ties occur; in practice of 
course exact ties are unlikely to arise. 
We next illustrate the theorem by several examples. The 
proof is given in the Appendix. 
Example I .  
Let 1 ,  2, and 3 be three towns that can be connected to a 
common municipal water system. The capacity needed to supply 
each town is assumed to be predetermined, the decision being only 
whether to connect or not. The costs of connection are as follows: 
Consider for example the prices pl = 30. p2 = 25. p3 = 30. 
With these prices, {1,2) is uniquely the most profitable set. 
If this set is announced as the tentative outcome, player 3 may 
try to raise his price, and players 1 and 2 may try to lower theirs. 
It may be checked that there is only one strong equilibrium: 
* * * * 
namely, pl = 26, p2 = 30, p3 = 36. At p . each of the sets 
{1,2), {1,3), {2,3) and {1,2,3) has a surplus of 6 units and 
equilibrium is achieved with any surplus-maximizing mechanism g 
that breaks the tie in favor of the set {1,2,3) i.e. such that 
* 
g(p = i1,2,3). Then no player can lower his bid without being 
- 
excluded, and no one has an incentive to raise his bid. It is 
* 
also interesting to note that pi is just the marginal cost of 
serving i, that is, the difference between c(N) and c(N-i), for 
sll i. This result holds generally for 3-person, superadditive 
games without cores (Young, 1980) . 
E x a m p l e  2. 
Consider six towns of equal size that can be supplied with 
water from a common source. The common cost c(s) of developing 
the source depends only on the number s of towns served, as shown 
in Figure 1. In addition there may be a fixed connection for 
each town, depending on its distance from the source. We assume 
that these direct costs must be paid by each town separately if 
connected, so do not enter into the cost allocation problem ex- 
plicitly. Net of direct connection costs let the d e m a n d s  for 
being supplied from the common source be given by b = (18,18,15, 
- 
14,12,8); as shown in Figure 2. Figure 2 also shows for each 
number of participants s the marginal cost c(s) - c(s-1) of 
serving the sth participant. 
The efficient number of towns to serve is five, since beyond 
that the marginal cost exceeds the benefits. The strong equi- 
librium price occurs, roughly speaking, where the demand curve 
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" c r o s s e s "  t h e  marg ina l  c o s t  curve .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  l e t  each o f  
t h e  f i v e  towns s e rved  be charged a  uniform p r i c e  o f  10 ,  which i s  
t h e  marg ina l  c o s t  o f  s e r v i n g  t h e  f i f t h  town. A t  t h e s e  p r i c e s  
t o t a l  revenue i s  50,  j o i n t  c o s t s  a r e  4 0 ,  and p r o d u c e r ' s  s u r p l u s  
i s  1 0 .  However t h e  s u r p l u s  from s e r v i n g  any f o u r  towns i s  a l s o  
10,  which means t h a t  i f  any o f  t h e  f i v e  p l a y e r s  s e rved  lower t h e i r  
p r i c e s ,  a t  l e a s t  one o f  them w i l l  be excluded from a l l  maximum 
s u r p l u s  sets.  By t h i s  r ea son ing  w e  f i n d  t h a t  a  uni form p r i c e  o f  
10 f o r  t h e  towns s e rved  i s  a  s t r o n g  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  and indeed it 
i s  t h e  unique one.  (The p r i c e  o f  t h e  excluded town can  be any- 
t h i n g  up t o  1  0 )  . 
The example shows why it i s  neces sa ry  t o  c o n s i d e r  s t r o n g  
e q u i l i b r i a  i n s t e a d  o f  s imple  Nash e q u i l i b r i a :  i f  a l l  towns o f f e r  
a  p r i c e  of z e r o ,  t h e n  no town can uniZateraZZy i n c r e a s e  i t s  o f f e r  
and do b e t t e r ,  s i n c e  t h e  c o s t  o f  s e r v i n g  a s i n g l e  town i s  2 0 ,  
whi l e  t h e  maximum w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  pay i s  o n l y  18.  However, t h e  
n a t u r a l  tendency of  a l l  t h e  excluded towns w i l l  be t o  raise t h e i r  
p r i c e s  - -probably  s imu l t aneous ly  - - so  w e  would n o t  expec t  t h e  
b idd ing  t o  become s t u c k  a t  such an outcome, even assuming non- 
coope ra t i on .  
I n  t h i s  k ind  o f  example t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e  need n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  e q u a l  t h e  marg ina l  cost of  s e r v i n g  t h e  l a s t  town. 
Thus, i f  t h e  s i x t h  t own ' s  wi l l ingness - to -pay  were 1 1  i n s t e a d  of 
8 ,  t hen  t h e  unique e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e  would a l s o  be 1 1  ( b u t  t h e  
s i x t h  town would s t i l l  n o t  be s e r v e d ) .  
These examples a r e  analogous  t o  t h a t  of  a  f i r m  w i t h  a  s i n g l e ,  
d i v i s i b l e  p roduc t  o p e r a t i n g  i n  a c o m p e t i t i v e  market:  i f  t h e  f i r m  
does  n o t  c o n t r o l  p r i c e s ,  it w i l l  produce a t  t h e  e f f i c i e n t  p o i n t  
where demand e q u a l s  marg ina l  c o s t .  Moreover i f  t h i s  o c c u r s  where 
average  c o s t s  a r e  r i s i n g ,  i .e .  where marg ina l  c o s t  exceeds  average  
c o s t s ,  t hen ,  i n  t h e  s h o r t  r un  a t  l e a s t ,  t h e  f i r m  w i l l  r e a l i z e  a  
s u r p l u s  ( F i g u r e  31, which cou ld  be  termed " s t r u c t u r a l  s u r p l u s " .  
Price 
Quantity 
FIGURE 3 
However, if demand falls in the area where average costs 
are declining, as in Figure 4, then for the firm to break even 
prices must be set above marginal costs. In fact a non-uniform 
price is n e c e s s a r y  to achieve efficiency. The firm can just 
break even by charging a single price up to point A and then 
price-discriminating down the demand curve to the efficient 
point B. The point A is determined such that the area under PABQ 
equals the total cost of supplying the quantity Q. This phenom- 
enon is illustrated for the following variation of Example 2. 
Price 
Quanti 
FIGURE 4 
Z x a m ~ Z e  3 .  
Let the cost function be the same as before but let the net 
demands be (18,11,8,6,4,3). Then it is efficient to serve only 
four towns, and there is a whole class of strong equilibrium 
price vectors, corresponding to the fact that the core of the 
game v is nonempty. Producer's surplus is zero in every case. 
One equilibrium price vector, (8,8,8,6,-,-) is shown in Figure 5. 
4. EQUILIBRIUM AND MARGINAL VALUE 
The preceding examples suggest that a connection exists be- 
tween equilibrium solutions to the cost allocation game, and the 
value of including or excluding more participants at the margin. 
In this section we make this idea precise, and show that it is 
closely related to the core of the cooperative game defined in 
Section 2 and to the concept of subsidy-free pricing treated in 
the public utilities literature. 
A well-established idea in this literature is that every 
participant in a public enterprise should be charged at least 
the marginal cost of including him. This principle is sometimes 
called the "incremental cost test" (Alexander, 1912; Ransmeier, 
1942; Faulhaber, 1975). Assuming for the moment that N is the 
efficient set to serve, this condition says that prices should 
satisfy 
( 5 )  p. c (N) - c (N-i) 1 - for all i . 
It. is natural (as suggested by Faulhaber, 1975) to gener- 
alize this principle to groups of participants and require further 
that 
(7) lpi = > c(N) - c(N-S) for all subsets S G N  . 
S 
We call these the principles of individual and group marginal 
nost coverage, respectively. 
Another way of expressing these conditions is in terms of 
the surplus value function v(S). For example, (7) is equivalent 
to 
Lpi 2 (c (N) - lbi) + lbi + ( 2 bi - c (N-S) ) for all s SN, 
S N S N-S 
that is 
exi = 1 (bi - pi) 2 VIN) - V(N-S) for all S ~ N  . 
S S 
More generally, if N is not efficient we require that 
- 
< V ( N )  Lxi = - v(N-S) = max v(T) - max v(T) for all S ~ N  . 
S TEN T ~ S = @  
This condition says simply that the surplus enjoyed by the set S 
should not exceed the difference between the maximum surplus ob- 
tainable with S and the maximum surplus obtainable without S. 
It is called the group marginality principle. If it is not 
satisfied for some group St that is, if Exi > ;(N) - N - s  , then 
S 
the group S is being subsidized. Thus, another way of inter- 
preting condition (8) is that it implies a price structure which 
is subsidy-free, to use Faulhaber's term (1975). 
Suppose that we require in addition that the enterprise be 
zero-profit, i.e. that total revenues equal total costs. This 
is the same as requiring that xi = ;(N). Then it is easy to 5 
see that (8) is equivalent to the group rationality condition (4) 
- 
defining the core, because Ixi = V(N) implies that 1 xi 5 v(N) - 
N N-S 
V(N - (N-S) ) if and only if lxi 2 - ;(s) . Unfortunately, the core 
S 
may be empty in perfectly reasonable cases (e.g. Examples 1 and 2; 
see also Panzar and Willig (1977) for a more detailed analysis 
of this possibility). However, if we are willing to relax the 
zero-profit constraint to one of break-even or better --i.e., 
to nondeficit--then it is perfectly possible to have a subsidy- 
* 
free price structure, even though there may still be no core. 
This point seems to have been largely overlooked in the literature 
on regulated pricing, which has concentrated mainly on the zero- 
profit hypothesis. 
If we simply require that total revenues cover total costs 
(equivalently, that Exi 5 V(N) ) , then we can certainly satisfy 
N - ( 8 )  because all inequalities on x run in the same direction. 
- 
This allows, for example, the possibility of zero con- 
sumer surplus, which corresponds to the case of perfect price 
discrimination (pi = bi for all i). In many applications this 
may not be a reasonable solution --nor feasible, if consumers' 
willingness-to-pay is unknown. A more reasonable idea is to ask 
* 
Because of the equivalence noted above when a zero-profit 
constraint is imposed, it has become customary to use the term 
subsidy-free synonymously with core solutions. In the present 
context we prefer to distinguish between the idea of .subsidy-free, 
as expressed by ( 8 1 ,  and the group-rationality condition defining 
the core, which may also be interpreted as entry preventing. 
~ k a t  i s  t h e  maxin;um c o n s x m e r  s u r p l u s ,  i n  t h e  P a r e t o  s e n s e ,  t h a t  
i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  n o n - s u b s i d i z a t i o n ?  The answer --which b r i n g s  
u s  f u l l  c i r c l e  - - i s  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p a y o f f s  t h a t  r e s u l t  
from t h e  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  game d e f i n e d  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n .  
> 0 i s  s a i d  t o  be a  More p r e c i s e l y ,  a  v e c t o r  ( x l  , . . . , xn)  = _ 
m a r g i n a l  v a l u e  f o r  t h e  game v i f  it i s  subs idy - f r ee  and i s  n o t  
* 
dominated by any v e c t o r  t h a t  i s  a l s o  s u b s i d y - f r e e  (Young, 1 9 7 9 ) .  
Theorem 2 .  For a n y  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  c and demands  b, x i s  an  
- - 
e q u i l i b r i u m  p a y o f f  v e c t o r  f o r  some s u r p l u s - m a x i m i z i n g  
m e c h a n i s m  g  i f  and s n Z y  i f  x i s  a  m a r g i n a l  v a l u e  
- 
f o r  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  s u r p l u s  game T ( S )  = max ( l b i  - c ( T ) ) .  
T g  T 
Koreover,  x  does  n o t  depend on t h e  c h o i c e  o f  g ,  t h a t  i s  a l l  
- 
surplus-maximizing g  t h a t  have some e q u i l i b r i u m  y i e l d  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  
same set  of  e q u i l i b r i u m  p a y o f f s .  
C o n c r e t e l y ,  x i s  a  marg ina l  v a l u e  i f  and o n l y  i f  it s a t i s -  
- 
f i e s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  c o n d i t i o n s :  
- (10)  l x .  V ( N )  - v(N-S) 
1 - 
f o r  e v e r y S _ C N  , 
S 
( 1  1 )  t h e  sets S  such t h a t  e q u a l i t y  h o l d s  i n  ( 10 )  cove r  N . 
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  e v e r y  v e c t o r  i n  t h e  c o r e  o f  v i s  a  ma rg ina l  
v a l u e :  ev e r y  c o r e  v e c t o r  i s  subs idy - f r ee  and i s  undominated 
- 
because  c o n d i t i o n  ( 1  0)  w i t h  S = N r e q u i r e s t h a t  l x .  5 v  (N) 
1 - 
. Thus 
marg ina l  v a l u e s  g e n e r a l i z e  t h e  c o r e  i n  a  n a t u r a r  way and have t h e  
d i s t i n c t  advan tage ,  u n l i k e  t h e  c o r e ,  t h a t  t h e y  a lways  ex i s t .  
I f  t h e  game v i s  s u p e r a d d i t i v e  ( i . e .  i f  t h e  cost  f u n c t i o n  c 
i s  s u b a d d i t i v e ) ,  t h e n  it may be shown t h a t  t h e  ma rg ina l  v a l u e s  
s a t i s f y  a  k i n d  of  q u as i - co re  c o n d i t i o n  and a r e  a lways  i n d i v i d u a l l y  
r a t i o n a l - - t h a t  i s ,  x .  > v ( i )  f o r  a l l  i. F u r t h e r ,  i f  v i s  convex 
1 = 
( i . e .  i f  c i s  concave)  t h e n  t h e  c o r e  i s  nonempty and t h e  set  of 
marg ina l  v a l u e s  i s  i d e n t i c a l  w i t h  t h e  c o r e  (Young, 1 9 8 0 ) .  
* 
A p a r t i c u l a r  c a s e  a r e  t h e  s u b s i d y - f r e e  v e c t o r s  t h a t  maximize 
t o t a l  consumer s u r p l u s  l x i .  
N 
5. EXTENS IONS 
The preceding describes a method for allocating joint costs 
when demands are not known. The merit of the method is that it 
is simple and easy to implement; it leads to an efficient solution 
in the absence of information on demand; and the resulting prices 
have a normative justification related to the core--in partic- 
ular, they are Pareto-optimal subject to being subsidy-free. 
To help test the workability of the method, a gaming ex- 
periment was recently conducted at IIASA using actual cost data 
from a public enterprise in Sweden. The game involved six players 
and had a relatively small core. The players were given infor- 
mation only about their own demand. The bidding was conducted 
as described in Section 2 with only the "winning" set being an- 
nounced at each stage. Nevertheless, within 10 rounds the bidding 
had converged to a solution within about 0.3% of a core solution 
in spite of the fact that the players did not even know the cost 
function. 
To be truly useful, however the analysis needs to be extended 
to allow for nondiscriminatory pricing and for different levels 
of consumption by consumers. Both of these can be handled by 
straightforward modifications of the mechanism discussed above, 
the details of which will be given elsewhere. Another area of 
investigation is the extension of the approach to a general equi- 
librium framework. In view of the non-closure of the system this 
is likely to present difficulties. Most probably it can be done, 
but with very much more restrictive assumptions on the shape of 
the production and demand functions. This would be sacrificing 
a lot, however, since one of the prime motivations of this study 
is to provide an approach to allocation that is workable even in 
messy situations where there is nonconvexity, discrete products, 
and highly differentiated markets. In fact, conditions like these 
are to be expected precisely in situations where established 
markets do not exist and some regulatory mechanism is required. 
Finally, there is the question of whether a mechanism could 
be designed that guarantees zero-profit without sacrificing ef- 
ficiency and other desirable properties. The answer appears to 
5e that something must be given up: either efficiency or exis- 
tence of equilibrium, or at the least, convergency of the mech- 
anism. Another possibility is to restrict the shape of the 
production and demand functions. For example, if in the present 
model the cost function is assumed to be concave, then the surplus- 
maximizing mechanism will give only zero-profit outcomes, because 
it may be shown (Young, 1980) that all equilibrium payoffs are 
in the core. 
APPENDIX 
Theorem I .  For any c o s t  f d n c t i o n  c, t h e r e  e z i s t s  a  surpZus-maz- 
i m i z i n g  mechanism g  such t h a t  t h e  c o s t  a l l o c a t i o n  game 
has a s t r o n g  e q u i l i b r i u m ;  moreover for  any such e q u i -  
l i b r i u m  p  t h e  s e t  produced, g ( p ) ,  i s  e f f i c i e n t .  
- - 
Proo f .  Suppose t h a t  and p s a t i s f y  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o n d i t i o n s :  
- 
- - (12)  - < b  and pi - bi P = -  f o r a l l i 9 5  I 
( 1  3) f o r  ev e r y  i t h e r e  e x i s t s  a maximum s u r p l u s  se t  
ex c l u d i n g  i , 
- ( 1 4 )  S i s  a  maximum s u r p l u s  se t  . 
- 
W e  c l a i m  t h a t  i f  g ( p )  = S,  t h e n  p i s  a  s t r o n g  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
- - 
Suppose i n s t e a d  t h a t  p 1  i s  a  change o f  s t r a t e g i e s  such  t h a t  eve ry  
- 
p l a y e r  who changes  d o es  b e t t e r  t h a n  b e f o r e .  I f  i changes  s t r a -  
- 
t e g i e s ,  p i  $ pi, t h e n  w e  must have p i  < pi and i € g ( p l ) ,  because  
.-. 
i ' s  payoff  was n o n n eg a t i v e  under 5, s o  it must be p o s i t i v e  under  p ' .  
.-. - 
But t h e n ,  by ( 1 3 ) ,  g ( p l )  c anno t  be a  maximum s u r p l u s  se t ,  
- 
c o n t r a d i c t i n g  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  mechanism g .  T h e r e f o r e  p i s  
- 
a  s t r o n g  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
- - 
Next, it i s  e a s y  t o  see t h a t  such a  p a i r  ( S , p )  e x i s t s .  Begin 
w i t h  p  = b; l e t  s be an  e f f i c i e n t  se t ,  which i s  t h e  same a s  a  
- - 
maximum s u r p l u s  se t  when p  = b.  I f  some p l a y e r  i i s  c o n t a i n e d  
... ... 
i n  e v e r y  maximum s u r p l u s  set ,  lower i t s  p r i c e  u n t i l  it i s  n o t ,  
and r e p e a t  f o r  a l l  p l a y e r s .  I n  a t  most n  s t e p s  a  p r i c e  v e c t o r  
- - 
p  w i l l  be o b t a i n e d  such t h a t :  S  i s  s t i l l  a  maximum s u r p l u s  set  
... 
under p; no p l a y e r  i s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  e v e r y  maximum s u r p l u s  set;  
... 
p  5 b  and pi = bi f o r  a l l  i G 5 .  Now choose  any mechanism g  such 
... - ... 
- 
t h a t  g ( p )  = S f  and t h e  proof  o f  e x i s t e n c e  i s  completed .  
... 
I t  remains  t o  be shown t h a t  f o r  eve ry  s t r o n g  e q u i l i b r i u m  p, 
... 
t h e  set  S = g(p)  i s  e f f i c i e n t .  For  e v e r y  set  T and 0  5 a  5 1 
... 
- - 
d e f i n e  p ( a , T )  a s  f o l l o w s :  
... 
Now l e t  T '  = { i  $i H : P i l b i }  and suppose  t h a t  f o r  some O<a '< !  
- 
S i s  n o t  maximum s u r p l u s  f o r  p ( a 1 , T ' )  = p ' .  L e t  S '  have maximum 
... 
s u r p l u s  under  p ' .  S i n c e  was a  maximum s u r p l u s  set  f o r  p, and 
... ... 
e ' ,  it must be t h a t  S ' n T '  # 4 .  L e t t i n g  T" = S117T'  and 
- 
a 'I = 2a,  it f o l l o w s  t h a t  every m o s t  p r o f i t a b l e  se t  f o r  p ( a W , T " )  = p "  
... ... 
c o n t a i n s  T". T h e r e f o r e  T" C T ( p M ) ,  s o  under  p" e v e r y  p l a y e r  i n  T" 
... ... 
g e t s  a  positive p a y o f f ,  whereas  under  p  e v e r y  p l a y e r  i n  T" g o t  
... 
z e r o  p a y o f f .  S i n c e  p  and p" d i f f e r  o n l y  on  T" ,  t h e  s t r o n g  equ i -  
... - 
l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  i s  c o n t r a d i c t e d .  
The c o n c l u s i o n  i s  t h a t  S maximizes s u r p l u s  under  p ( a , T 1 )  
... 
whenever a  > 0. Hence i n  t h e  l i m i t  a l s o  maximizes s u r p l u s  
0  
under p  ( 0 ,  T '  ) = p  . Observe t h a t  
... -. 
Hence i f  w e  d e f i n e  by 
... 
- 
t h e n  < and a l s o  maximizes s u r p l u s  under  6 .  The re fo r e  
- 
- - - 
- 
which by ( 1  5 )  i m p l i e s  
- L Pi - c(S) 2 1- bi - C ( S )  
S-S S-S 
- 
But pi 2 bi f o r  a l l  ~ E Z  because  a t  e q u i l i b r i u m  no p l a y e r  
r e c e i v e s  a n e g a t i v e  payo f f .  T h e r e f o r e  ( 1 6 )  i m p l i e s  
- 
1 bi - ~ ( 8 )  2 1-bi - c ( S )  t 
S-S S-S 
p rov ing  t h a t  5 i s  e f f i c i e n t .  0 
Theorem 2. Given any c o s t  function c a n d  demands b, x is a n  
- - 
equilibrium payoff vector for some surplus-maximizing 
mechanism g if a n d  only if x is a marginal value for 
- 
the associated surplus game ; = max ( l b i  - c (T) ) . 
TCS T 
- 
Proof. Suppose t h a t  p i s  a s t r o n g  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  t h a t  g ( p )  = S i s  
- 
t h e  set  produced,  and x i s  t h e  payoff  v e c t o r .  W e  know t h a t  
w 
(17)  x l  w - 0 and xi = 0 f o r  a l l  i B S  . 
.., 
Second, w e  know from Theorem 1 t h a t  S i s  e f f i c i e n t ;  and s i n c e  
- 
S maximizes p r o f i t s  under  p w e  have 
.., 
(18)  v ( T )  - l x i  = lpi - c ( T )  ' i p i  - c ( S )  = v(S) - - l x i  f o r  a l l  T , 
T T S S 
and 
(1 9 )  
- 1 x. < v(S) - v(T) forallT . 
S-T 1 = 
Using (1 7 )  it follows that if S nT = 4 ,  
lxi = l-xi = < - 1 X. 1 = < v(Z) - V(T) , 
S SnS S-T 
hence 
- - 
(20) 1x. 5 v (5) - max v(T) = v(N) - v (N-S) for every S . 
S 1 - T : TnS=$ 
- 
This says that x is subsidy-free. Finally, since p is an 
- - 
equilibrium, no player can raise his price and do b.etter. This 
means that for every i there is a maximum surplus set Ti ex- 
cluding i. For T = Ti, ( 1 9 )  and (19) hold as equalities, and 
hence (20) holds as an equality for some set S containing i. 
Therefore the payoff vector x is Pareto-optimal subject to being 
- 
subsidy-free, so it is a marginal value. 
Conversely let x 0 be Pareto-optimal subject to being 
... 
- 
- 
subsidy-free. Then every efficient set is a maximum-surplus 
set with respect to the price vector p = b - x. Using (20) with 
- ... ... 
S = N-H, we deduce that 1 xi 2 0. Since x 2 0, it follows that 
- - - 
- 
- x = 0, that is, pi - bi i N-' for all i 9s. Finally, Pareto- 
optimality implies that, for every i there is a maximum-surplus 
set excluding i. Therefore by the first part of the proof of 
- 
Theorem 1 ,  p is a strong equilibrium for any surplus-maximizingg 
- 
- 
such that g(p) = S. Moreover, the payoff to i is xi = 0 for all 
- 
- 
, and xi = bi - pi for all i ~ s .  
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